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And Power Corrupts ... : 
Religion and the Disciplinary 
Matrix of Bioethics 
M. Therese Lysaught 
Religion and Public Bioethics: Complicating the 
Received Narrative 
"Public bioethics" is often positioned as a sub field in the discipline 
of bioethics. It is depicted as a public practice of deliberation or de-
bate among professionals or a plurality of voices about how society 
should proceed in the face of a particular problem related to health 
care or biotechnology. Such debate seeks to produce some level of 
consensus via rationally coherent arguments useful for formulating 
guidelines to be promulgated by policyrnakers (aka public policy)' or 
for influencing the beliefs and values of the public. Daniel Callahan 
and others, in fact, differentiate this sense of "public" bioethics from 
other forms ofbioethics that they variously label "foundational," 
"clinical," "pedagogical," "institutional," "community," "civic," and 
so on.2 
Yet to limit "public" bioethics to the action of public panels, 
public conversations, or the crafting of government regulation and 
health policy is somewhat artificial and misleading. For contempo-
rary images of the clinical setting are structured along similar lines. 
The clinical context is narrated as a pluralistic space where a diverse 
set of people-patients, physicians, nurses, allied health workers, 
families-come together as both strangers and moral strangers yet 
are bound to work together cooperatively. To resolve moral disagree-
ment, various stakeholders must meet and, through reasoned con-
versation, craft a balance between the strictures of institutional/pub-
lic authority and individuals' rights to pursue their own goods. In 
fact, Bette-Jane Crigger notes (with concern) that medicine (by 
which she means the clinical setting) is well on its way to becoming 
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"a privileged domain-perhaps the preeminent domain-of public moral dis-
course in contemporary American society.'" The public, it seems, is every-
where. 
One could in fact argue that there is no subcategory of bioethics that is 
not public. One reason is that the bioethical architecture of what are deemed 
to be putatively distinct arenas draws on a shared narrative of public space, a 
narrative whose "core thesis ," as Michael Sandel puts it, is this: 
Society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own 
aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when 
it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any 
particular conception of the good; what justifies these regulative 
principles above all is not that they maximize the social welfare or 
otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the 
concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good and inde-
pendent of it. This is the liberalism of Kant and of much contempo-
rary moral and political philosophy.4 
Again and again, the settings of particular subfields ofbioethics as well as the 
ways in which they locate and choreograph agents within those settings repro-
duce this narrative. 
Not only does this narrative give a particular shape to the practice ofbio-
ethics across contexts.5 It tells a consistent story about religion. Across the 
board, from the pluralistic contexts of public to clinic, religion presents a prob-
lem.6 Religions posit beliefs that are, by definition, not held in common and 
as such cannot provide a shared basis for moral exchange.' At best, they are 
denied intrinsic moral value.8 At worst, they emerge as one of the primary 
sources of moral conflict. Belying their apparent neutrality toward religious 
convictions, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in their highly influential 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics return again and again to a particular example 
of self-destructive behavior, "bizarre actions prompted by unorthodox religious 
beliefs. "9 One of the few other contexts in which religious convictions are men-
tioned in their text is in the conflictual situation of refusal of treatment. 10 In a 
similar fashion, H. Tristram Engelhardt, the once-despairing champion of the 
Enlightenment project in biomedical ethics, again and again rhetorically 
equates the terms "particular," "religious," "parochial," and "ideological."" Ex-
amples abound to demonstrate how the dominant mode ofbioethics no longer 
takes theological or other substantively rational authors seriously but rather 
simply deems them irrational and outside the purview of legitimate argu-
ment.12 
Yet it is not just that religious beliefs confound the canons of moral con-
sensus and rationality. As problematic as religion can be in the clinical setting, 
to allow participation of religion within the practice of public bioethics can be 
even dicier. James Childress, in his account of the process behind the NBAC 
report on human cloning, names the fundamental issue: 
Arguments for and against a significant role for religious convic-
tions in public policy appeal to two different fears , which may be 
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more or less plausible depending on the particular liberal, pluralistic 
democracy at a particular time. On the one hand, opponents often 
fear religion's divisiveness. John Rawls begins his book on political 
liberalism with the story of religious conflict in the West, and we 
know full well religion's role in conflicts around the world. Many 
who argue for a reduced role, or no role at all, for religious convic-
tions in public policy share this fear, and it is not unreasonable. 13 
Religion, in other words, must be handled carefully vis-a-vis the public sphere 
because it is inherently dangerous and violent. 
Childress's remarks echo one of the foundational myths that undergird 
the U.S. liberal social vision described earlier by Sandel. As Judith Sklar tells 
the story: 
Liberalism ... was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil 
wars , which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a re-
buke to all religious institutions and parties. If the faith was to sur-
vive at all, it would do so privately. The alternative then set, and still 
before us , is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-
indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and vi-
olence, and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to 
protect the freedom and safety of very citizen. I. 
The modern state, in other words, arose out of what came to be known as the 
"wars of religion" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as that force 
necessary to make the peace. Behind the pluralist narrative outlined earlier, 
then, lies a vision of the state as the necessary hedge that protects individuals 
against the coercive tyranny of religious authority and the inevitable violence 
inherent in religious difference. 
The story of the state as that which saves us from the violence of religious 
passion, as the agent of peace, has become canonical for both U.S . public policy 
and bioethics. More important, it is historically and theologically false. Theo-
logian William Cavanaugh carefully displays that the received story that the 
liberal state emerged as a response to religious violence gets the matter back-
ward. 15 Drawing on the work of social theorists and historians Charles Tilly, 
Quentin Skinner, and Richard Dunn, Cavanaugh compellingly argues that the 
modern liberal nation-state began to emerge well in advance of the wars of 
religion, documents how indeed most of these wars were not fought between 
Protestants and Catholics but rather between co-religionists (i.e., between Prot-
estants and Protestants or Catholics and Catholics) , and shows how emerging 
religious identities were manipulated as tools of unflinching Politiques in their 
quest for state power. 
Cavanaugh argues that key to emerging states' ability to foment such wars 
was the very creation of the modern category of "religion." Through the Middle 
Ages, religion was understood as a virtue, deeply intertwined with bodily prac-
tices located within the institutional structure of the Roman Catholic Church. 
But in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the term "religion" began to 
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be used in a new way. It begins to refer to a system of beliefs, a set of propo-
sitions that could be held by newly minted modern "individuals" and that could 
exist separately from one's public loyalties to institutions of church or state.'6 
Thus, as he notes: "To call these conflicts 'Wars of Religion' is an anachronism, 
for what was at issue in these wars was the very creation of religion as a set of 
privately held beliefs without direct political relevance. "17 
Cavanaugh convincingly demonstrates that this theoretical reconfiguration 
of Christianity as a now fractured diversity of religions fit not only with En-
lightenment epistemological presuppositions but, more important, was em-
ployed as a tool for wresting power from the only institution strong enough to 
stand against the state, namely the church. "True religion," in Locke's words, 
found a new home not in a public, communally extended and authoritative 
institution but rather in the private and solitary confines of an individual's 
mind and conscience. As such, the medieval configuration of disciplinary au-
thority split between church and state was dismantled: "What is left to the 
Church is increasingly the purely interior government of the souls of its mem-
bers; their bodies are handed over to the secular authorities."'8 The state, in 
other words, assumed unchallenged disciplinary control over individuals' bod-
ies as religion was brought into service of the sovereign. 
Cavanaugh's account upends the foundational myth that sets the terms of 
debate in the conversation on religion and public bioethics. With others, it 
reveals the problematic nature of the concept of , religion' as it functions within 
the field ofbioethics.'9 It displays as mythical the fear that Childress identified 
as not unreasonable. And it unmasks the modern state's claim to be the keeper 
of peace rather than what it is-the purveyor of violence on a scale preViously 
unimaginable. 
But Cavanaugh's rereading of the historical record does more than chal-
lenge the very way 'religion' is conceptualized within bioethics; more funda-
mentally, it problematizes the very depiction ofbioethics itself. Far from being 
an open, public deliberative practice that involves reasoning with other citizens 
or a limited set of procedural norms that facilitate the full range of individual 
value judgments, bioethics instead has become part of the disciplinary matrix 
of the modern social order, a key practice in the state's management of bodies 
within its purview. 
For bioethics, like its ally medicine, is about nothing if it is not about 
bodies. Bioethics does an extraordinarily good job at masking this fact; rarely 
will one see bodies referred to, even obliquely, within the discipline ofbioethics. 
The various distinctions between subfields ofbioethics (especially distinctions 
between 'clinical bioethics ' and other types) are but further attempts to distance 
the discipline from the bodies that it organizes. 
It will be the burden of this essay to make this case, that bioethics ought 
properly be understood as a disciplinary matrix that serves the modern Levia-
than of state and market. The purpose of doing so, of course, is to narrate a 
rather different vision of 'public bioethics.' For without a more accurate ac-
counting of the nature and function of public bioethics, it will not be possible 
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to begin to posit how 'religion' might even begin to position itself in relation-
ship to it. 
Cavanaugh's account of the reconfiguration of the relationships between 
religion, bodies, and the state is clearly indebted to the legacy of Michel Fou-
cault, a debt I share. For those who are not familiar with Foucault, I begin with 
a brief overview of his analytic framework. The major work of the essay will 
be to display how bioethics fits the Foucauldian paradigm. So as to avoid the 
appearance of special pleading, I will turn not to theologians to develop this 
account20 but rather to social scientists and bioethicists. 
Bodies and Disciplinary Matrices 
Robert Zussman and others have recently argued that bioethics can and ought 
to learn from sociology.21 Foucault might well have concurred, holding as he 
did that medicine is a mode of applied sociology.n Although Foucault is not 
quite what Zussman has in mind, for those who have read his account of 
medicine as well as his work on power, knowledge, and discipline, it is but a 
small step from there to the field ofbioethics.23 
Central to Foucault's analysis is a recognition of the material reality of 
bodies and the politics that is nothing other than production and organization 
of bodies within culture.24 Bryan Turner, one theorist who has attempted to 
systematize a theory of the body, summarizes Foucault's thesis: "The body as 
an object of power is produced in order to be controlled, identified, and repro-
duced."25 Power, for Foucault, is not negative per se. Rather, it is essentially 
productive. As Anthony Giddens notes, "Power is actually the means whereby 
all things happen, the production of things, of knowledge and forms of dis-
course, and of pleasure."26 Joanne Finkelstein extends this definition, capturing 
its more decentered, circulatory, weblike, operational sense: 
Power is a strategy of relations that gives some individuals and 
groups the ability to act and keep acting for their own advantage. 
Power is also the ability to bring about a desired situation and to 
prevent the actions of those who would thwart such desires .27 
Key to the productivity of such power is the fact that it is wielded not in an 
overt, coercive manner but rather that individuals come to wield it over them-
selves. In other words, within a regime of disciplinary power, each person-
by internalizing the norms and surveillance of the social order-effectively 
disciplines her or himself. As such, Finkelstein writes, this exercise of power 
is "extremely subtle as it can direct individuals toward actions the eventual 
outcome of which will not necessarily be to their advantage."28 The basic goal 
of disciplinary power is to produce persons who are docile-persons, in other 
words, who do not have to be externally policed.29 
But how does this occur? How does it happen that individuals-or rather 
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individuals vis-a.-vis their bodies-become formed in such a way as to inter-
nalize the agenda of the wider social order? What, in other words, are the 
mechanisms of governmentality?30 Bodies are constituted, Foucault and others 
argue, via disciplinary matrices consisting of the intersection of three key el-
ements: discourses, practices, and institutions." 
A discourse is that body of concepts and statements that make possible the 
appearance of objects at a particular historical moment and provide a language 
for talking about them. Discourses define and produce objects of knowledge, 
governing the ways a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned 
about. Variously put, nothing that is considered meaningful exists outside dis-
course, nothing has any meaning outside of discourse, and nothing outside of 
discourse is considered meaningful. 32 
Social theorist Arthur Frank pushes this definition one step further, noting 
how deeply allied discourses are to bodies. Discourses, he notes, are: 
cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities and limitations, which 
bodies experience as already there for their self-understanding . ... 
These mappings form the normative parameters of how the body 
can understand itself. . .. Discourses only exist as they are instan-
tiated in on-going practice or retained by actors as "memory 
traces."" 
One example of such a discourse would be the modem scientific account of 
anatomy. Arising in part out of the structures of the human body, it equally 
arranges, depicts, defines, and describes the way in which inhabitants of West-
em culture literally "map" their bodies; bodies no longer consist of humors or 
mime the structures of the heavens, but instead are composed of organs, sys-
tems, tissues, cells, DNA, and so on. Equally, the languages of disease and 
illness are discourses mapping bodies' self-understandings.34 
Dorothy Smith refers to discourses as "extralocal texts-texts created else-
where-that organize action and relationships in local settings by instructing 
actors in those settings as to what they should do and perhaps proscribing what 
they cannot do."" Frank elaborates on Smith's reading of discourse with the 
example of DRGs: 
In medicine, diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) . .. are a prime ex-
ample of discourse . .. . DRGs are written documents, created by a 
group of specialists working on the basis of individual clinical expe-
rience and aggregate data but working apart of any specific scene of 
clinical practice. These specialists produce a code of diagnosis-all 
illness must map into DRG categories to be treated-and detailed 
specifications of what count as reimbursable services for each cate-
gory. DRGs, as a textual code created elsewhere, thus organize activ-
ity in local clinics. People in local settings still make decisions and 
deliver care, but the text limits and directs what they can do.36 
This particular example highlights a key feature of discourses-that the content 
of the "extralocal text" is understood as technical or formal knowledge, knowl-
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edge that is increasingly esoteric, the purview of specialists and elite profes-
sionals. 
As such, knowledge associated with discourses becomes a mode of social 
power. As Finkelstein notes: 
Where knowledge becomes a source of power, as it does with techni-
calor formal knowledge, it is the technocrat, the owner, the control-
ler of knowledge, who gains social power. Significantly, when techni-
cal knowledge is the basis of power, the inequalities between 
provider and consumer are frequently concealed by the idea that a 
professional service is offered .... Indeed, the inherent power and 
domination of the situation are disguised insofar as the monopoly 
created by specialist knowledge has been legitimated by the sanction 
oflaw and professionalism.37 
Disciplinary identity and professionalization are key markers of the develop-
ment of discourse. 
Discourses, of course, cannot float free . In order to do the work of consti-
tuting and disciplining bodies, of inscribing the meanings of the social order 
into bodies, they must be incarnated in social practices. Discourses and prac-
tices stand in reciprocal relationship: discourses define the rules for practices, 
which in turn embody those discourses. 
Discourses, then, are reproduced into the social world by techniques of 
discipline, by the practices of bodies on which they are inscribed. As Frank 
notes: 
Theory needs to apprehend the body as both medium and outcome 
of social "body techniques," and society as both medium and out-
come of the sum of these techniques. Body techniques are socially 
given-individuals may improvise on them but rarely make up any 
for themselves-but these techniques are only instantiated in their 
practical use by bodies, on bodies. Moreover, these techniques are as 
much resources for bodies as they are constraints on them; con-
straints enable as much as they restrict.38 
In other words, through their enactment these techniques produce bodies that 
embody the commitments of the wider social order; they produce "docile bod-
ies." And it is through the creation of such bodies, that then go on to act in 
the world in self-motivated ways, that practices further realize (make real) and 
reproduce the commitments of the discourses in the world. 
Discourses are legitimated in part by being embedded in institutions, social 
organizations which have attained sufficient power to render their discourses 
true. Institutions, Frank writes, "have a specificity within both space and time. 
A discourse can only be spoken or enacted; it is nowhere but in that act or 
speech. An institution is a physical place where one can go, which mayor may 
not be there any longer."39 
Institutions, then, provide both a centralized social space for exponential 
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consolidation of productive power as well as visible social sanction for the 
truths put forward in a particular discourse. Such institutionalization, at least 
in our culture, further reinforces the "scientific" character of the discourse's 
growing body of knowledge. 
Further, institutions enable methods of surveillance that are crucial to the 
mapping of the bodies within their population as well as the process of nor-
malization. Via disciplines like medicine, certain attitudes and practices come 
to prevail as normal and acceptable. Institutionally sanctioned discourses both 
define the "normal" and, through techniques and practices, encourage individ-
uals to regulate and achieve her or his own conformity with the established 
rules.40 
Disciplinary matrices of discourses, techniques, and institutions are able 
to exercise power in this decentralized manner insofar as the discourse is able 
to sustain a regime of truth. "Truth" in this sense points to the creation of 
knowledge as a function of power (power, as noted above, which is understood 
not negatively but as productive) . Truth is a product of discursive practices 
understood to emerge only within a structure of rules, practices, and institu-
tions that control the discourse and collaborate to establish a given claim as 
"true." Knowledge shaped by discourses, empowered by institutions, and 
wielded through techniques and practices thus has the power to make itself 
true. 
Truth then is embodied and reproduced through "rituals of truth," prac-
tices shaped according to the rules of the discourse which then, not surpris-
ingly, reinforce the truth claims of the discourse (one might think, for example, 
of the "truth" of the anthropological claim that we are autonomous individuals 
embodied and reproduced through the practice of advance directives) . Through 
these many factors, the networks of productive power serve to produce, via 
inscribed bodies, particular styles of subjectivity. Subjects are both produced 
within discourses and simultaneously subjected to discourses. Such subject 
production is one component of the process of normalization. 
These, then, are the components of a Foucauldian disciplinary matrix. By 
not allowing attention to be diverted from bodies, such an analysis seeks to 
unmask how particular discourses-particular fields of knowledge and truth 
claims-are used in conjunction with institutionalized practices to effect social 
and political ends, even while rhetorically claiming to be apolitical, neutral, and 
objective. It turns attention not to abstract ideas or disembodied "wills" but 
rather to the usually covert operations of productive power, power that produces 
particular kinds of embodied subject-citizens and in doing so reproduces the 
body of the state. 
The Disciplinary Matrix of Bioethics 
Equipped with an outline of disciplinary matrices and how they function, we 
can tum now to the field of bioethics itself. One might counter that the con-
nection between bioethics and the state is already inferred in the phrase "public 
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bioethics."" This analysis seeks not only to establish that fact but to display 
the intricate connections between the various types of bioethics, suggesting 
that they ought rather be understood as coordinated aspects of an overarching 
matrix rather than as conceptually and practically distinct activities. By narrat-
ing bioethics as an institutionally located set of discursive practices, its function 
as a normalizing discipline in service to state and market becomes disturbingly 
clear. 
Bioethics as Discourse 
In historical perspective, discursive formation entails a discontinuous trajec-
tory in which one can plot the emergence of a new discourse and the decline 
of an old one. Although such a history will often be recounted as seamless, 
more often it is one of ruptures and radical breaks. As history is written by the 
winners , so "the persons and professions that rose to prominence will tend to 
write the history of the debate in a way that makes their rise seem somehow 
natural. ".2 
Such a pattern indeed characterizes recent histories of the development of 
the field ofbioethics. As per the standard narrative of the genesis ofbioethics, 
its earliest origins lay among theologians, but substantive theological discourse 
was quickly replaced by the more advanced discourse of philosophy. Kevin 
Wildes narrates this standard account, that bioethics emerged because of the 
increased technologization of medicine in the 1960s and that theological ethics 
was pushed aside because "philosophical ethics offered the hope of resolving 
such questions without appealing to the faith of a particular community."'3 
Wildes further proclaims the canonical narrative, highlighting the transition 
from theology to (in his own words) secular or civil religion: 
Bioethics has emerged as a field that is distinct from theological 
ethics and traditional physician ethics even though both disciplines 
were important to the development of the field .... [Olne needs to 
understand why theological voices receded from the field . ... The 
turn toward a secular bioethics became a search for a secular or civil 
religion that might bind the sentiment of citizens who were at least 
nominally divided by religions, cultures, or other differences." 
The transition here is cast as seamless, logical, necessary. 
But is this the only way to reconstruct this history? Is this the most accurate 
way to tell this story? John Evans, in fact, narrates the same history quite 
differently.45 He helpfully debunks the dominant myths that shape the recent 
histories ofbioethics, including those that suggest that the principles' approach 
to bioethics was necessitated by expanding commitments to democracy or sto-
ries that plot such developments as "natural" progressions. Over against the 
accounts that claim that the dominant approach to bioethics is necessitated by 
the pluralistic nature of contemporary U.S. society, Evans convincingly dem-
onstrates that the growth and institutional embodiment of bioethics in the 
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United States, via government advisory commissions, took shape precisely as 
a way to circumvent pluralism, to "avoid more direct democratic control. "46 As 
he demonstrates, the pluralist model of democracy was in fact "unacceptable 
to the scientists, who feared that an 'excitable' public would shut down not 
only [human genetic engineering] research, but other research in their home 
jurisdiction that the public did not understand."47 They were fearful, in other 
words, of funding cuts,." pointing to the hidden economic substrate of all these 
discussions. 
Bioethics, then, emerged as a mechanism for shaping and controlling the 
hoi polloi. A first step toward such an end would be to create a body of esoteric, 
technical, formal knowledge that would be portrayed as inaccessible to the 
common person while simultaneously constituting objects of knowledge and 
defining the acceptable parameters for discussion. Although many bioethicists 
protest the characterization of their field as one of specialized knowledge (a 
claim made most often by detractors) one finds such descriptions with relative 
frequency. Most often such claims arise within conversations about hospital-
based ethics consultation. David Casarett and his colleagues note that some 
"contend that the ethicist is a specialist who possesses expertise in moral theory 
... [that] ethicists, like physicians possess a unique fund of knowledge, 
problem-solving techniques, experience and techniques that allows them to 
solve complex moral problems."49 Nancy Dubler paternalistically states the 
claim in a via negativa when she maintains: "It is simply not within the purview 
of most patients and family members to understand the complex nature of the 
moral judgments facing them."so 
Though the precise content of this knowledge base remains coritested 
within the realms of hospital-based ethics consultation, it has become well 
established within the realm of public bioethics. Bioethics' specialized knowl-
edge defines the acceptable parameters of discussion, prescribing certain ways 
of talking about topics and excluding others (i.e., rules of inclusion and exclu-
sion) . Substantively rational arguments and religious language have been sys-
tematically excluded, or at least carefully positioned so as to be mostly irrelevant 
within public bioethics. While dominated by a formal, instrumental rational-
ity,'1 public bioethics privileges a particular point of view, a particular concep-
tion of "the good" and of the ends that society and individuals within it must 
necessarily pursue and preserve.52 Evans captures it well when he notes that it 
operates "with a very constrained list of universal, commensurable ends that 
have become institutionalized by the dominant profession in the debate."'3 
These ends are, of course, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmalef-
icence, and justice.54 
As the above accounts make clear, specialized, technical knowledge is in-
extricably intertwined with professionalization, the creation of experts or spe-
cialists.ssProfessions are defined, in fact, by their role as those who apply a 
distinct system of knowledge to a well-defined set of problems delimited within 
a particular jurisdiction. Insofar as such knowledge is abstract, professional 
training is necessary to know how it is to be applied. s6 That bioethics has 
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become a "profession" is little contested. 57 Evans fleshes out the demographics 
of this shift: 
While the bioethics profession has been strengthening its jurisdic-
tion over ethical decision making in public bioethical debates, it has 
grown even stronger in its other jurisdiction of decision making in 
hospitals (clinical bioethics). The bioethicists have also increasingly 
taken on the trappings of a classic profession, with a professional 
association of 1,500 members; 200 centers, departments, and pro-
grams; an academic degree (a master's in bioethics from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and a Ph.D. in bioethics from various other uni-
versities). There is even a debate about licensing: who is qualified to 
be a clinical bioethicist and to offer ethical judgments in hospitals? 
Licensing, and other internal and external controls over who is a le-
gitimate member of the profession, is the hallmark of an increas-
ingly successfu' profession. The organization that accredits hospitals 
has required since 1998 that every hospital have a mechanism for 
resolving ethical problems that arise.58 
In the words of Henk ten Have: "In a certain sense, ethics has become part 
and parcel of the technological order. It has been professionalized as an auton-
omous discipline external to medical practice. It is dominated by an engineer-
ing model of moral reasoning and impregnated with the idea of a technical 
rationality, applying principles to practices."59 
In an interesting twist on the standard discussions of professionalization, 
Tod Chambers insightfully recounts how central the image of "centering" has 
been to the internal contests shaping the field over the past thirty-five years.60 
Centering narratives trace the "migration" of the practice ofbioethics from the 
academic realm to that of the hospital or clinic; from the realm of "theory" into 
the realm of "action"; from philosophical training to medical training, with the 
rise of clinical bioethics. His story closes with more recent attempts to wrest 
bioethics from both philosophy and medicine by sociologists.61 With each 
move, such centering strategies have functioned as attempts to establish au-
thority, legitimacy, and jurisdiction within the field by defining which concep-
tual tools shape the field and who ought rightly be included as a conveyor of 
bioethical power.62 
As Chambers notes, all these scholars and more use the metaphors of 
inside-outside to describe this shift in their work. 63 Intriguingly, the same meta-
phors shape the discussion on religion and bioethics. The conversation re-
volves around phrases such as whether religions should be "included" in public 
bioethics, how they might "contribute to" the debate, "how a religious com-
munity might enter into the discussions in bioethics,"64 or how they might 
"influence" public bioethics. True to the founding myth, religion and theology 
must be located "outside" the public sphere in such a way that they must 
"enter" it, be "included" or "influence" it, as if from a distance. Yet perhaps a 
mark of how completely irrelevant theology has become to bioethics, the re-
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centering of the field away from theology does not even enter into Chambers's 
account. 
Evans's sociological analysis of the growth ofbioethics also demonstrates 
how the discourse of bioethics clearly functions as an "extralocal text," in 
Smith's sense of the term. As he documents , once the Belmont principles were 
established, bioethicists began to apply them and their form of argumentation 
beyond their original focus in the ethics of human experimentation.6s Captur-
ing the work of Belmont in textbook form, Beauchamp and Childress's Prin-
ciples of Biomedical Ethics expanded the form and content of this approach to 
apply to almost all ethical issues in science, medicine, and society.66 The twin 
sanctions of public approval and an authoritative textbook fueled principlism's 
growth, creating an "enormous demand" for ethics training, spawning a new 
and ongoing industry of books, workshops and courses "designed to make 'the 
theories and methods of ethics' 'readily available to more people in a shorter 
period of time.' "67 As a result, this particular method increasingly shaped 
bioethical discussion across localities-in the academy, the literature, the pub-
lic forum, the media, and the clinic. As David Rothman notes, "the new rules 
for the laboratory permeated the examining room, circumscribing the discre-
tionary authority of physicians. The doctor-patient relationship was modeled 
on the form of the researcher-subject; in therapy, as in experimentation, formal 
and informal mechanisms of control and a new language of patients' rights 
assumed unprecedented importance."68 The long arm of state policy reaches 
into all levels of the social body. 
Techniques and Practices of Bioethics 
As James Lindemann Nelson notes, bioethicists "wield explicitly normative 
techniques."69 The discipline ofbioethics, in other words, comprises a distinct 
set of practices, techniques by which discourses are enacted, inscribed onto 
bodies, and thereby reproduced as truthful in the world. These techniques 
mediate the "extralocal texts" of the bioethics canon into local settings. 
Bette-Jane Crigger, in her account of hospital-based ethics consultation, 
provides one of the most straightforward accounts of bioethics as a practice. 
Noting from the outset that bioethics has become "established as a particular 
form of practice," the intent of her essay is to explore the ways in which "bio-
ethics does a further sort of cultural work that tends not to be recognized. "70 
Although working with a slightly different sense oflocal and extralocal knowl-
edge, Crigger's account ofbioethics reflects Frank's account of how practices 
mediate extralocal texts, making it possible for abstract norms to shape local 
actions, to interpret individual bodies. Speaking first of medicine, she notes: 
Medicine operates as a paradigm of meanings on at least two levels: 
as a system of concrete, local, ready-made meanings, and as a sys-
tem of abstract, global, negotiated meanings. As a system of local, 
that is clinical, meanings, medicine construes individuals' privately 
experienced sensations as symptoms and signs upon which to base 
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diagnosis, recommend treatment, and assess prognosis. That is, 
medicine names and thus confers a particular kind of socially recog-
nized significance ("illness" or "disease" of a given sort) on personal 
bodily experience .... There is a fixed set of indicators to be de-
ployed in construing embodied experience .... Overlaying this "local 
knowledge" of the clinic, however, is a system of more abstract and 
far-reaching meanings that link medicine-or better perhaps, pa-
tients' embodied relationship with medicine-to the wider social or-
der. 71 
These higher order meanings, she notes , are "abstract and self-consciously 
normative" as well as "profoundly social. "72 Each moment of clinical practice-
be it a practice of medicine or bioethics-realizes these higher order meanings 
in the world and serves to reproduce them, slowly working to transform the 
world into its image: "Each clinical encounter offers the prospect of incremen-
tally transforming the set of meanings upon which not simply the immediate 
participants, but also the wider culture, may draw, refashioning the universe 
of discourse within which the next encounter will take place." 73 Ethics consul-
tation stands as a vehicle for negotiating between the local and higher order 
meanings, offering, "the potential not only to 'discover' normative meanings 
in clinical decisions, but also actively to create new norms and values in the 
process of making those decisions."" 
Such a dynamic could be displayed for each bioethics practice. One will 
suffice for our purposes. Consider the practice of informed consent. Rothman, 
above, has noted how the practice of informed consent has reshaped the clinical 
encounter in the direction of the politics of the laboratory; the patient-physician 
relationship now more closely resembles the subject-researcher relationship. 
Drawing on the normative anthropology captured in the primary end of bio-
ethics-the principle of autonomy-the practice of informed consent con-
structs the patient as first and foremost, primarily, essentially an autonomous 
subject, even though the patient's autonomy may be severely compromised by 
illness or even though their own anthropology-should they hail from a non-
Western culture-provides no space for contemporary U.S. concepts of auton-
omy. The practice of informed consent shapes patients by persuading them 
(or coercing them, since most medical procedures will not be performed with-
out a signed document) to locate themselves under the rubric of autonomous 
consent, to understand their relationship with the physician as somewhat con-
tractual (based on a signed document, one which waives many of their rights), 
as consumers who are "choosing" a particular course of medical treatment, 
having weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the options. 
Institutionalization 
Institutions, as noted earlier, are social organizations that have attained suffi-
cient power to render their discourses true. The institutional dimension of 
bioethics takes two main forms. Clearly, the main institutional form ofbioeth-
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ics has been the U.S. government, in the form of government advisory com-
missions. Evans traces the dominance of principlism to the increased scope of 
state intervention in issues related to science and medicine. Pointing to an 
obvious but often overlooked fact: "A blunt indicator of this spread in state 
interest are the titles of the first and second government bioethics commis-
sions. The 'National Commission' was 'for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.' The 'President's Commission' was 
'for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research.' " 75 
Evans establishes the crucial role played by these commissions in estab-
lishing the parameters of truth. First, they determined which arguments would 
count as legitimate, thereby granting jurisdiction to some professions over 
others. 76 The replication of this mode of reasoning in subsequent government 
commissions reinforced those truth claims. Second, these parameters for ar-
gumentation were codified into law via government regulations. As Evans 
notes: 
The influence of this new profession grew rapidly. Through the in-
fluence of the first government advisory commission, its form of ar-
gumentation was written into public law as the proper method of 
making ethical decisions about research involving human subjects. 
Henceforward all researchers at institutions that receive federal 
funds would have to learn and adopt this form of argumentation. 77 
It is important to note that the power of law was reinforced by force of eco-
nomics. The Belmont Report, by translating its reasoning into government 
regulation, which was tied to government funding, rendered the principles' 
approach and its formal rationality to be the 'truth' vis-a-vis public bioethics. 
This is the case now not only for human subjects research but for the clinical 
sector as welL'8 Indeed, bioethics has become a primary agent of the presence 
of the state in the practices of research and medicine. 
From policy through law and economics, this new regime of truth has 
been further reinforced by the institutionalization of the theoretical apparatus 
supporting the discourse via the production of knowledge within the academic 
realm. The 'truth' of Belmont was first expanded-almost evangelically-by 
Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics and its aftermath. 
Yet this dissemination, of course, was not accidental. As James Lindemann 
Nelson notes: "The birth of principlism itself is intertwined with the advent of 
state intervention in ethics ... . It is also well known that the Belmont princi-
ples were created at the urging of the state, and enacted as regulations, with 
the help of Kennedy Institute members who were simultaneously writing Prin-
ciples of Biomedical Ethics. "79 
One can trace additional links between the quiet hand of the state and the 
culture of academic bioethics. As Evans notes: 
Since journals refuse to publish results from research not reviewed 
by IRBs [Institutional Review Boards], the principles became the 
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standard not only for federally funded research, but for privately 
sponsored research as well. This was a huge resource given to the 
new profession ofbioethics in its competition with other professions: 
the government was essentially requiring researchers at every re-
search institution and hospital in the nation to learn its form of ar-
gumentation.80 
The linkage between the institutions of state, clinical research, and the academy 
render a clean distinction between "public bioethics" and other realms of ethics 
(i.e., foundational, clinical, institutional, community, etc.) problematic. Here 
we see the reification (one could say, the fetishization) of the substance of 
bioethics: its content and parameters "do not seem to have been created by 
anyone but is just 'common sense' or even 'fact' -and takes on a life indepen-
dent of its creator."81 
Thus, tracing the institutional infrastructure ofbioethics begins to unmask 
the intimate relationship between bioethics and the state. Even if one was 
narrowly to construe public bioethics as concerned with the crafting of public 
policy, etymology would lead to the same conclusion. As Ruth Malone notes, 
the Greek origins of the word policy "link it to citizenship, government, polity, 
citizen, city. That is, the idea of policy arises originally from the relationship 
of citizens to one another in a common public space."82 Indeed, as the literature 
on the rise of formal rationality indicates, the state is one of the foremost 
proponents of formal rationality.s' Thus, the state appears not only as an his-
torical factor in the rise of bioethics but indeed as so critically constitutive of 
the discourse itself that bioethics might rightly be construed as itself an ap-
paratus of the state. 
The State, Bioethics, and Normalization 
Foucault's account of disciplinary matrices seeks in part to demonstrate how 
the state/social order effectively shapes the subjectivities of citizens within their 
purview to embody that social order's normative claims, in order to reproduce 
those norms toward the end of maintaining, furthering, or reproducing that 
state/social order.8' As mentioned earlier, this process of producing docile bod-
ies is known as normalization. 
Evans, as we observed, debunks the claim made in the recent histories of 
bioethics that the principles approach was required by our society's increasing 
recognition of pluralism or what he calls the "expanding democracy" expla-
nation.8S Rather, as he notes, this story masks a deep disconnect between the 
objectives of the allied scientific-government complex and the populace. The 
first government advisory commission, the National Commission (1973), he 
argues, was "instructed by Congress to create a set of ends," ends that "had to 
be portrayed as universally held by the citizens, but had to be applied without 
a method of determining empirically what the ends of the citizens were."86 Its 
subsequent task, as outlined in the previous section, was to establish these 
ends as truth, to diffuse them throughout the institutional infrastructure of 
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research and patient care, and through the practices of bioethics to persuade 
the citizenry to adopt these as their own ends. 
Crigger captures this normalizing function in the practice of hospital-
based ethics consultations. For Crigger, bioethics consultation poses a paradox. 
On the one hand, bioethics' "peril" is that it may "work toward imposing on 
patients a particular, content-laden vision of what the dominant culture per-
ceives to be morally most significant and most appropriate. "87 Yet its peril is 
equally its promise, as she notes. 
The practice of bioethics consultation in clinical settings not only 
guides individual decisions, but just as importantly announces the 
dominant culture's commitment to fashioning a common moral or-
der in a pluralistic society. That commitment and the practices in 
which it is inscribed in the clinic hold both promise and peril. 
Promise in that ethics consultations may indeed promote a common 
moral idiom, if not also a stronger commonality of norms . .. [Bio-
ethics] work(s) toward shaping some significant portion of a shared 
moral order.88 
Indeed, for Crigger, "the moral and political authority of ethics consultation on 
this model are seen to derive from a societal mandate to foster shared decision 
making. "89 
Yet can this promise be fulfilled without imposing culturally dominant 
views of the good on patients? It is hard to see how it will be avoided. In fact, 
Casarett et al. obliquely point to this inevitability: "It is rare," they note, "that 
an ethics consultant can simply hand down an opinion. In fact, that typically 
happens only when the primary issue has been legally resolved, or, to put it 
another way, when a national discourse has produced a consensus that is then 
imposed by the state."90 
Thus, the normative claims of the liberal political philosophy that shapes 
the social order are, through the practices ofbioethics, subtly prioritized. More 
powerfully, although claiming that particular goods are permitted to exist in 
their private spaces, an important component of the normative infrastructure 
is that such particular convictions ought not be held too tightly; all commit-
ments must ultimately be negotiable. Casarett et al., in their reflections on the 
process of ethics consultation, highlight this dynamic: 
Often, the immediate obstacle to consensus is unwillingness to en-
gage in dialogue .. .. Consensus is fragile and is easily disrupted 
when one or more participants hold tenaciously to a principle or 
value. The fragility of consensus requires that all participants, in-
cluding the ethics consultant [though equally this would include the 
patient or physician], be willing to reconsider their own normative 
claims. Indeed, this is the only way normative validity can be evalu-
ated . .. . Genuine understanding of the issues involved may threaten 
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deeply held beliefs about the values that make collaborative social 
life possible. Just as allocation decisions frequently require us to 
make choices that call into question certain fundamental values that 
hold society together, moral argumentation in clinical ethics high-
lights troubling choices that we might prefer to keep hidden. Ethical 
deliberation requires participants to examine deeply held values 
such as the sanctity of life, the primacy of autonomy, and the com-
monly held view that lives do not have a dollar value. These threads 
make up the fabric of our social existence. To bring them to the sur-
face in order to examine and weigh them threatens the integrity of 
the view we have of ourselves and our society.91 
In the end, all particular commitments must bow to the overarching norm of 
consensus. 
But it is no longer only the common moral idiom of autonomy that bio-
ethics serves to normalize among the citizenry through its practices; bioethics 
more recently appears to be serving as an agent for the increasingly powerful 
alliance between state and market. The standard portrayal of public interaction 
around questions ofbioethics is one of discourse, argument, persuasion, and 
consensus. Yet often this image is bolstered by that bizarre fiction of "the 
marketplace of ideas" (a metaphor rendered even more absurd in these days 
of global capitalism). Can the capitalist resonances be accidental?92 
Troyen Brennan abandons any pretense ofbioethics ' neutrality and main-
tains that the future of the field lies in embodying more consistently the com-
mitments of political liberalism and, indeed, the market. Brennan calls for a 
new medical ethics that reflects "the public morality ofliberalism" and respects 
the resource constraints of "market justice. "93 But although Brennan issues 
this as a call for bioethics to move toward, others acknowledge how deeply 
bioethics is indebted to and allied with market economics.94 Ruth Malone fo-
cuses on the economic infrastructure of bioethics, noting that although med-
icine and bioethics once framed its discourse in military terms, more recent 
metaphors have shifted to the language of the market.95 As she notes: 
The market metaphor has assumed a prominent place in U.S . dis-
course on medicine and health policy, displacing an earlier military 
metaphor ("battling disease," "doctor's orders") still in use but now 
considerably less prominent. . .. [T]his shift in language has been 
extremely effective in promoting a different understanding of medi-
cine and health care .. . . [T]he metaphor has been taken up readily, 
perhaps due to its compatibility with the economism of much health 
services research methodology, such as cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness studies.96 
Metaphors, of course, do not merely label things; they form our concepts, 
create the parameters for action, define what can even be seen as a problem 
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or issue.97 Market metaphors within bioethics function as extralocal texts, en-
hancing bioethics' ability to mold health care institutions, practitioners, and 
patients as increasingly ideal consumers. Market metaphors embody particular 
philosophical presuppositions about the nature of the person and the nature 
of social interaction: 
In markets, the relationship to the other is primarily, if not solely, 
instrumental: the other is necessary only as a means to the end of 
purchase or sale of products. Buyers ' and sellers ' relations are based 
in contractual obligations of business that do not extend to concern 
for or dependence on one another .. . . The product-market metaphor 
relies on the self-interested utility-maximizer view of human agents 
that is congruent with neoclassical economics, in which individuals 
make choices based on their perceptions of what will benefit them 
most. Agency is reduced to rational choices made to buy or to sell, a 
matter of exerting preferences rather than of acting in accordance 
with constitutive values or concerns.98 
Market metaphors are likewise deeply enmeshed with the images that shape 
standard displays of public bioethics. As Malone notes: 
The product-market metaphor works for talking about policy in sev-
eral important ways: we understand policy at least partially in terms 
of political negotiation, which bears more than a passing resem-
blance to negotiations for market goods. And we view the practice of 
policymaking as one in which choices must be made among differ-
ent ideas or viewpoints, much as a shopper in a market must 
choose among competing brands of soap. Also, we sustain the cul-
tural myth of "objectivity" as a desirable and achievable goal in policy-
making, congruent with the moral impassivity of the market.99 
Malone sees deep incongruities between such an anthropology and health care 
policy, which at least in theory "addresses how we as a society will deal with 
sick and injured people who must depend on the care and concern of others . 
. . . This view of human agency as instrumental rationality leaves little space 
for the kinds of actions that embody different values-for example, generosity, 
mercy, or solidarity."' oo 
In reality, however, this is not an incongruity but rather a Foucauldian 
window into the operative but obscured foundations of bioethics, a window 
that Malone's own words suggest: 
The product-market conception of health policy (and health care) 
also helps to keep the experience of suffering safely at bay for us ... . 
Sickness, as others have noted, represents a challenge to the social 
order. If the perceived need for policy solutions to social problems 
may be understood as a confrontation with uncontrolled elements, 
the product-market metaphor suggests a restoration of order: a rule-
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based mechanism (the market) that both preserves and controls the 
autonomous self In the quite recent past, this has been largely a 
function of medicine: we have a vast and illuminating literature on 
the medicalization of social problems .. . . The market has begun to 
supplant even medicine as a dominant mechanism of social con-
trol. 'O' 
Not coincidentally, Evans (evidencing his debt to Weber) traces the dominance 
of principlism to the development of double-entry bookkeeping in 1494, which 
paved the way for modern capitalism and formal rationality. The logic of prin-
ciplism, he argues, is isomorphic with the logic of accounting. The principles 
of bioethics function as units of commensuration-akin to other commensu-
rable metrics such as utility, risk-benefit analysis , profit, and money.'02 
In short, much of public bioethics functions as a normalizing practice that 
masks the economic interests and dynamics that are the real forces that shape 
public policy. As Ed Pellegrino notes: "In stem cell research, for example, com-
mercial and technological imperatives dominate the decisions under the guise 
of a value-free agreement among 'reasonable' people who will not be so be-
nighted as to invoke some transcendental source of morality in support of their 
position.",o3 How metaphorical is it, we might ask, when Albert Jonsen refers 
to the principles ofbioethics as "the common coin of moral discourse"?,o4 
Theology and the Disciplinary Matrix of Public Bioethics 
More could be said, but for now, we come to the end of a rather different 
narration of the practice of public bioethics. lOs Where, then, does this leave the 
question of religion? Clearly, a thoroughgoing constructive account of the re-
lationship between religion and public bioethics would take me beyond the 
limits of this chapter. Let me indicate, instead, the direction such an account 
might take. 
Over against standard responses to the question of religion and bioethics, 
this alternative construal ofbioethics forces a question: Is it the proper task of 
religion to contribute to, support, undergird, disseminate, and so on, the dis-
ciplinary matrix of the modern social order? Is it the job of religion to assist 
the state in the management of bodies within its purview? Is it the task of 
Christianity to assist the state in normalizing its citizens according to particular 
canons of philosophical and economic "truths," especially norms such as au-
tonomous individualism, adversarial rights , or utility, which are deeply at odds 
with the central truths of the faith? Is it proper to Christianity to aid the state 
in producing docile citizens, those who have internalized market paradigms of 
consumer choice so deeply that they apply them to all aspects of their lives, 
including the realm of moral discernment? 
It is not clear that many authors-theologians and scholars of religion 
included-would not assent to the above questions, at least in their broad 
outlines. Time and again, religion is cast as instrumental to the ends and needs 
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ofbioethics. 106 Too many accounts of how to "relate" religion to public bioethics 
end up being little more than attempts to make a kinder and gentler Leviathan. 
But Leviathan it remains. And theologians do little to challenge the idolatrous 
and heretical claims of the state. 107 
To answer "no" to the above questions will be to issue a radical call. For 
to answer "no" will be a call to orient religion (or, more accurately, theological 
reflection on medicine and healing) toward a different social body. If Foucault's 
account is valid, truths (as known, as productive) do not exist apart from the 
discourses in which they are embedded, discourses that inscribe bodies into 
certain visible practices which are institutionally extended. Truth, in other 
words, sits in a complex relationship to power-the power to produce bodies 
and, more important, to reproduce particular social bodies. Theology, indeed, 
is such a discourse-a field of knowledge that forwards a regime of truth by 
aiming toward the reproduction of the social body of the church through con-
crete, embodied disciplinary practices. To answer "no" to the above questions 
is to issue a call for the church. 
And this, of course, is why bioethics has left theology behind. For inextri-
cable from substantive theological discourse is the one social body with the 
real potential to challenge the unbridled authority of the state, the one that the 
state has , since the sixteenth century, been trying to render powerless. l OS Is it 
indeed a coincidence that shortly after medical ethics emerged within theolog-
ical circles, the state-biotech-market complex quickly mobilized to consolidate 
disciplinary oversight, deftly circumscribing religion to the sphere of auton-
omy/informed consent, thereby evacuating it of any independent power? 109 
Forty years later, any pretensions on the part of the church to encroach on 
the disciplinary authority of the state meets with fierce resistance. As Catholic 
hospitals find, their attempt to embody in their institutional practices particular 
visions of the good or common good (such as the sanctity and dignity of life) 
via a refusal of certain practices is increasingly considered unacceptable. The 
scathing invective with which Catholic hospitals are derided by organizations 
such as "MergerWatch" and the recent legislative assaults on Catholic hospi-
tals' practices regarding emergency contraceptives (which are largely misrep-
resented in the popular press) and "conscience clauses" for health care profes-
sionals evidence that, indeed, bodies are the site upon which power is 
contested. 110 
In the end, the relationship between theology and the disciplinary matrix 
of public bioethics must remain both critical and constructive. If Christianity 
is to be truthful and liberatory, it must first "query and unmask the dynamics 
of power" embedded in the discipline of bioethics. The important critical task 
is to uncover the hidden processes-in its discourse, in its practices, in its 
institutional affiliations-by which medicine and bioethics seeks to normalize 
us not toward freedom and autonomy (as the rhetoric would suggest) but rather 
toward the ends of the state/biotech/market. Such was the work of this chapter. 
And second, it must construct alternatives. In other words, the task of 
Christian theology is to help people live as Christians through illness, healing, 
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dying, and medical care. Its task is to forward the countercultural claim that 
Christian convictions make a difference for who one is, for how one lives (i.e., 
how one is produced)-in short, to maintain the truthfulness of Christian 
convictions. To do so will require practical, visible, institutional embodiment-
an embodiment in a church, not the state. To do so will require robust theo-
logical language, alternative discourses wedded to alternative practices and re-
gimes of understanding self/body directed toward and sustained by a church 
that is able to produce bodies which em-body these truths. Such a claim will, 
indeed, strike fear into the hearts of those James Childress mentioned at the 
outset. Yet such fears would indeed, I abjure, be unfounded. In the words of 
William Cavanaugh: 
If we understand the unity of body and soul, we must understand 
that what is really at stake is not body-power versus soul-power, but 
competing types of soul/body disciplines, some violent and some 
peaceful. Christians must understand that the state's control of the 
body is a control of the soul as well. The church must see that is 
own disciplinary resources-Eucharist, penance, virtue, works of 
mercy, martyrdom-are not matters of the soul which may some-
how "animate" the "real world" of bodies, but are rather body/soul 
disciplines meant to produce actions, practices, habits that are visi-
ble in the world. For the church to be a true social body it must re-
claim not only its body but its soul from the state, and institute a 
discipline which is truly Christlike-a power based in compassion 
and martyrdom, suffering, and reconciliation, and not in a revived 
Christendom. III 
Through the disciplines of the Christian tradition, bioethics could find in the-
ology a very different kind of power, not the power of state violence but the 
power of peaceableness, a power made perfect through weakness. How fitting 
this is for a practice whose center is sick and broken bodies. 
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p. 26) , Childress ("Religion, Morality, and Public Policy," p. 65), and so on. Stephen 
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tive technologies, capital punishment-ought to be refused admission to medical 
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